I've finished McLean/Nocera All the Devils are Here (cf. link, link). I still think highly of it, although I don't think it ended quite as well as it began. I liked it for the "deep background" on the 80s and 90s; the corollary is that they are not quite as wonderful for the ticktock of the closing weeks (I suppose for ticktock you go to Andrew Ross Sorkin, whom I haven't read)--at the very end, they are reduced to diary entries.
Something else: they're impressively incomplete in their coverage. I can't really fault them for this: the story is too protean for one book anyway. But they do seem to go fishing where the fish are; so, good stuff on Merrill and AIG and Goldman, moderately good on Ameriquest and Countrywide (have they been reading Michael Hudson's Monster?)--more haphazard on Lehman, almost nothing on B of A, Citi or the Morgans (and why do our chroniclers say so little about WaMu?).
But here's a takeaway: no surprise to say that the uproar had many components. My point is that in retrospect I think we saw some coming; others, really not. That is: careful students understood that real estate was an unsustainable bubble; that a savings glut brought trouble in its wake; that trade imbalances posed a long-term threat (still do, IMO). But I don't think many but outsiders realized just how glow-in-the-dark potentially lethal banking had become. Yes, yes, we know about the John Paulsons, the Andrew Redleafs, who saw through the mess and profited from it. But most of us probably thought, as they say of Alan Greenspan, that it just wan't conceivable a big firm would blow itself up.
We know now how cruelly wrong that was: big firms did blow themselves up, and others imbibed billions of our taxpayer dollars to escape it. The real virtue of books like McLean/Nocera is that they give us a beginning taste of just how Guignol dysfunctional big banking really was.