The rest of you puzzle over Putin, I'm still trying to figure out de Gaulle. No, not de Gaulle, but his "allies," in this case the President of the United States. You remember FDR, the one in the wheelchair, with the cigarette holder and the benign (if icy) smile.
Here's the thing: de Gaulle had one overvaulting purpose which was to preserve the identity of an independent French nation, aka "the Free French." In pursuit of his goal, he stepped on toes, kicked shins, wounded egos. But he also had a clear and coherent strategy: he also understood that to achieve his purpose, his best path was to make the French indispensable to the Allied war effort (and to make sure that the Allies knew it). Many--perhaps most--people who encountered de Gaulle during the war did not love him, but quite a few came to understand him. Notable example, de Gaulle drove Churchill into legendary rages. But Churchill was not one to let personal indignation blind him to pragmatic convenience: he usually found a way to accommodate himself to de Gaulle because he understood that at the end of th day, de Gaulle was on his side. And Eisenhower--he certainly had his disagreements with the general, but he was usually pretty good at keeping his relationships off the boil, and he seems to have understood just what de Gaulle could do for the common cause.
The puzzle is Roosevelt. He seems to have encountered de Gaulle in a posture of sporadically contained outrage, laced with withering contempt. Unlike Churchill, he seems never to have let down his guard. Worse, his rancor seems to have infected those round him--Secretary of State Cordell Hull, for example, or Secretary of War Henry M. Stimson (though Hull who wasn't the sharpest knife in the drawer, might well have wound up in the same posture without exterior assistance).
And why? Particularly after D-Day, when the Allies were back on Northern European soil, and when it was clear that de Gaulle, vindicated, was evolving into an authentic national hero--what was the percentage for Roosevelt in persisting in trying to marginalize, even to humiliate, him? Why not at least tolerate--no, why not embrace someone who was clearly emerging as the authentic voice of a liberated nation?
I don't have any answer to that one. One might be tempted to say that FDR found de Gaulle "too conservative" for his taste. Such a conclusion might have been a mistake--de Gaulle eluded and still elude simple characterization. But in any event, it didn't prevent Roosevelt (or at any rate, his government) from maintaining cordial relations with the quisling Vichy statelet almost to the end. One might speculate that Roosevelt found de Gaulle too cozy with then communists. This would surely have been a misjudgment of the man who did more than any other to thwart communism in postwar France. And in any event, it would be pretty rich coming from someone so chummy for so long with "uncle Joe" Stalin).
One is--I am--tempted to speculate that de Gaulle brought out the inner Roosevelt: a steely-hearted loner who really didn't like anybody very much, however well he may have concealed his isolation under a gauzy exterior of charm. One might be tempted, but then you'd have to explain Roosevelt's apparently genuine affection for Churchill--often at least as refractory as de Gaulle, yet a man who may well have been Roosevelt's one genuine friend. As I say, I don't have a good answer to that one. For valuable prizes, readers are invited to set me straight.
Here's the thing: de Gaulle had one overvaulting purpose which was to preserve the identity of an independent French nation, aka "the Free French." In pursuit of his goal, he stepped on toes, kicked shins, wounded egos. But he also had a clear and coherent strategy: he also understood that to achieve his purpose, his best path was to make the French indispensable to the Allied war effort (and to make sure that the Allies knew it). Many--perhaps most--people who encountered de Gaulle during the war did not love him, but quite a few came to understand him. Notable example, de Gaulle drove Churchill into legendary rages. But Churchill was not one to let personal indignation blind him to pragmatic convenience: he usually found a way to accommodate himself to de Gaulle because he understood that at the end of th day, de Gaulle was on his side. And Eisenhower--he certainly had his disagreements with the general, but he was usually pretty good at keeping his relationships off the boil, and he seems to have understood just what de Gaulle could do for the common cause.
The puzzle is Roosevelt. He seems to have encountered de Gaulle in a posture of sporadically contained outrage, laced with withering contempt. Unlike Churchill, he seems never to have let down his guard. Worse, his rancor seems to have infected those round him--Secretary of State Cordell Hull, for example, or Secretary of War Henry M. Stimson (though Hull who wasn't the sharpest knife in the drawer, might well have wound up in the same posture without exterior assistance).
And why? Particularly after D-Day, when the Allies were back on Northern European soil, and when it was clear that de Gaulle, vindicated, was evolving into an authentic national hero--what was the percentage for Roosevelt in persisting in trying to marginalize, even to humiliate, him? Why not at least tolerate--no, why not embrace someone who was clearly emerging as the authentic voice of a liberated nation?
I don't have any answer to that one. One might be tempted to say that FDR found de Gaulle "too conservative" for his taste. Such a conclusion might have been a mistake--de Gaulle eluded and still elude simple characterization. But in any event, it didn't prevent Roosevelt (or at any rate, his government) from maintaining cordial relations with the quisling Vichy statelet almost to the end. One might speculate that Roosevelt found de Gaulle too cozy with then communists. This would surely have been a misjudgment of the man who did more than any other to thwart communism in postwar France. And in any event, it would be pretty rich coming from someone so chummy for so long with "uncle Joe" Stalin).
One is--I am--tempted to speculate that de Gaulle brought out the inner Roosevelt: a steely-hearted loner who really didn't like anybody very much, however well he may have concealed his isolation under a gauzy exterior of charm. One might be tempted, but then you'd have to explain Roosevelt's apparently genuine affection for Churchill--often at least as refractory as de Gaulle, yet a man who may well have been Roosevelt's one genuine friend. As I say, I don't have a good answer to that one. For valuable prizes, readers are invited to set me straight.