The law adopted last month gives municipal bondholders a lien on taxes and general revenues collected by the cities and towns whose bonds they buy.I've got a better idea. Let's pass a law giving first priority to all bloggers whose screen names begin with "B." It would make about as much sense as prioritizing precisely those people most likely to have the motive, the opportunity and the wherewithal to estimate this risk and (this is important) to price it into their original loan? Assuming (as I should think we are permitted to assume) that they have already charged for this bankruptcy haircut, if we now let them stick it to the general fund, aren't we just paying them twice?
This means the bondholders would be repaid before other creditors such as workers, suppliers and pension fund beneficiaries if the municipalities went bankrupt.
I suppose I could be wrong if we find a document in the file that says "and besides, boss, if there ever arises a real risk of default, we just get our
2 comments:
I share your outrage at your gall, and some substantial doubt as to its Constitutionality under the contracts clause. But . . .
Apart from the fact that the bondholders are evil, is there really any difference between this and a critical vendor order? A more identifiable and sympathetic victim class, I suppose.
Well in both cases, I suppose there is an ex post v ex ante problem--but by now you'd have to say the critical vendor rule is pretty well known.
My main focus on critical vendor is the guy in his law office drafting the Ch 11 petition, looking out his window to see trucks unloading at the debtor's dock knowing that (without critical vendor) these guys will get hosed.
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