Showing posts with label India. Show all posts
Showing posts with label India. Show all posts

Sunday, December 19, 2010

Mistry Updated

Just after finishing a readaloud of Rohinton Mistry's A Fine Balance, I ran across The Economist's what it identifies as "India's Languishing Countryside," and found myself wondering whether the author understood--he must--how much he was providing a backgrounder/update on Mistry's grim but grimly satisfying novel of life under "The Emergency"--Indira Gandhi's lawless power grab that kept her illegitimately in office in the late 70s.  Readers of the novel and the update will recognize the home turf of Ishvar and Om, the two benighted tailors who carry Mistry's story.  The E does provide some extra background: the importance of post-independence land reform in shaping the structure of the Gangetic economy, for  instance, and the ironic dilemma created by the fact that the land is simply too productive for its own good, leading to a kind of overpopulation and land prices that nobody can pay.  The also adds just a bit about India's economic "renaissance," if it is that, which remains offstage but still sets the background for village life.   Christmas (!) special on


There are, perhaps surprisingly, some tiny notes of solace in this hard story--particularly, the insight that Hindus and Muslims here in the villages actually get on quite well, somehow immune or at least indifferent to the clashes that drive their brethren in the cities.  But perhaps the central point is how little seems to have changed at least since Mistry's time and perhaps in ages beyond memory.  Forget about the "abolition" of the caste system: leatherworkers are still leatherworkers, midwives are still midwives.  The E quotes B. R. Ambedkar, the architet of the India's constitution, himself from the bottom of the caste hierarchy:  "What is the village but a sink of localism, a den of ignorance, narrow-mindedness and communialism?"

What indeed?   If the reporter got it right, the answer would have to be:  not much.

Afterthought:  I hope to say more about the Mistry novel tonight or tomorrow morning.

Friday, October 08, 2010

What Made the Raj Go Respectable?

I can't remember when I've had a book that was such an easy, absorbing read as this one that I glommed onto last month in London--Plain Tales from the Raj, an assemblage of oral-history recollections of life for Brits in India during the last generation of the Empire, i.e., before 1947. It's all assembled by one Charles Allen, otherwise unknown to me, apparently put together for some sort of BBC special back in the 70s.  The timing couldn't have been better:  a generation after the handover of power (i.e., 1947) there was time enough for most people  to have forgotten whatever they knew on the topic, and just in time to catch the first-person observation of the survivors before the onset of rust and rot.

There are many delights here but let me restrict myself to a central puzzle.  That is: by (I think) virtually universal assent the Brits, whatever their vices, gave India a kind of good government: mostly competent and almost entirely honest, in the sense that there was virtually no hint of the kind of palm-greasing and favor-selling you might expect in in this kind of bureaucratic state.

That's wonderful and the sheer nostalgia value of such a story is justification enough for enjoying it now.  But step back a moment:  whatever their sense of civic duty in the 20s 30s 40s, it certainly didn't start out that way.  Quite the contrary: the first Brits to arrive in India (in the 17th Century), practiced an unsavory mix of banditry, piracy and thuggery, all under the aegis of commerce.  It was in these early years that we observe the legendary fortunes carried off by the likes of Hastings, Clive and Pitt who got their way pretty much by just helping themselves.

Apparently there was still a fair amount of corruption (though not nearly the wealth) among the purely commercial classes in the 19th and 20th Century.  But the bureaucracy and the quasi-bureaucratic army seemed to have stayed pretty clean.  The puzzle is: why?  Or how?  It's a bit like the question of what turned the Vikings from one of the most warlike peoples on the planet into one of the mast pacific?  So with the Brits: when does a buccaneer morph into a model of virtue? And can we have it bottled and wholesaled and distributed widely around the world today?

[Note:  for a headline, I was sorely tempted to use "Big Bad Raj is Sweet Rajah Now," but no, it really doesn't make any sense to me either.]

Monday, October 04, 2010

Thursday, September 30, 2010

Still Dead After All These Years

The Maynes remembered Augustus Ottoway, killed, at the Relief of Lucknow in 1857 and found dead on a dooley by Lord Roberts who 'took his dear friend Mayne out at early dawn and dug his grave and buried him in his frock-coat and top boots, and as they laid him there leant down and fixed his eye-glass into his eye as he always wore it in the heat of the fray.'  His grave now lies in on the seventh fairway of Lucknow Golf Course, 'a cause of great frustration to golfers.'
--Charles Allen (ed.) Plaion Tles form the Raj (1975)

I trust it was the dead Ottoway ant not the living Mayne who was buried.

Wednesday, July 22, 2009

The Vagaries of Language: Two Accounts

Tricky business, language. Two illustrations. First, a discussion of how folks in the Italian corner of Switzerland manage "dialect":
Dialect...in Italian Switzerland...runs along the edges of social divisions, age, sex and class in fascinating and complex ways. ...Dialect is the language of neighbourliness and the commune, but ... its use reflects very subtle canons of social behaviour. The country man or woman in a city shop may use dialect with impunity, but the middle-class city-dweller wil use Italian, certainly at first, less the shop girl feel insulted by such excessive familiarity. Similarly, the middle-class city dweller who returns to the village of his origin would give even greater offence if he did not speak dialect from the beginning.

...In traditional middle-class families, parents speak dialect with each other, as do the children, but children speak to parents and parents to children in Italian. ... Teachers chat in dialect int he common room but speak Italian to pupils in the classroom and in all other encounters. Children speak dialect among themselves and, of course, Italian to teachers. ... [In one research study] the boys spoke dialect among themselves but Italian to the girls, and the girls dialect among themselves but Italian to the boys. ... Adult men use dialect more than adult women, especially in towns and cities. ... Italian is the language of public life and dialect the language of private social relations. Hence it is not surprising that, as soon as a political organization or government body becomes larger than, say, twenty people, which it will generally not do on village level, Italian replaces dialect
--Jonathan Steinberg, Why Switzerland? 143-4 (2d ed. 1996)

And here, a more straightforward of all solutions, from the most British of azll 20th Century political leaders, India's Jawarhalal Nehru (Harrow, Cambridge, Inner Temple), who spoke English far more easily than he spoke any Indian language:
In any discussion Nehru would listen carefully to his interlocutor's accent, then carefully calibrate his own so that it would sound at least one social cut above.

--Arthur Herman, Gandhi & Churchill(Kindle 2009)
[Sourcing Nirad Chaudhuri,]

Wednesday, December 03, 2008

Civitas Mumbai Bombay Sum

Andrew Sullivan (following Christopher Hitchens) is more facile than usual when he says that he won't call it "Mumbai" any more because the name was chosen by a bunch of thugs the Hindu Nationalist Shiv Sena (link). Has he any idea what he is getting himself into here? If he doesn't like names chosen by corrupt gangsters, will he now eschew the use of "Zambia" and "Zimbabwe," reverting to "Northern and Southern Rhodesia?" Substitute "Palestine" for "Israel?" "Judea" for "Palestine?" "Place where the fish run freely" for some town in New England (sic!) that we (sic!) snatched from the Indians (sic!)?

I suppose he might say that the "Rhodesias" were themselves named by the corrupt thugs (in the form of European imperialists)--but then, so was Bombay. My point is not to glamorize Shiv Sena (nor, for that matter, to demonize Israel); my point is to suggest that this naming business is far trickier than Sullivan seems to have noticed, and there probably isn't any solution that will be above contention (and can he think of any government in the history of the race that doesn't bear at least a slight aroma of corrupt thuggery)? In the case of Bombay/Mumbai for example, it may be that the new name was imposed by some pretty nasty people. But it appears that there is a good grass-roots justification for the change, independent of any current politics. That is: aparently the name has been "Mumbai" all along in the Marathi and Gujarati--which just happen to be the languages most commonly spoken by the people on the streets (link). One more reason to regard "Bombay" itself as a foreign excresence.

Having said all this, I'll concede that Hitchens is basically right that whatever-you-call-it, that city in India, is worthy of our support and loyalty (link). We are all whatever-you-call-its now, and I proudly count myself in their number.

If Andrew wants to discuss this further, I would be happy to meet with him. I know a nice coffee shop on the Avenue of the Americas. In New Amsterdam.

Monday, December 01, 2008

Untouchables?

I wonder if Asra Q. Nomani's weekend LA Times opinion piece got whipsawed by events.   She writes about Muslims as "India's new 'untouchables'" (link; apparently she is getting air time over at NPR as well [link]).   It's a point worth exploring, but in her presentation, it seems to get all entangled with news of the massacre, in a way that reduces her main point to something near incoherence. 

I suspect we are seeing a revised text--revised, to all appearances rather hastily and ill-advisedly.  Better to have pulled back and wait a couple of weeks so she could argue, in a straightforward way and without reference to (Pakistan-based?) terrorists, that the position of Muslims in India has "deteriorated"--perhaps lately, or at any rate, since the partition of India and Pakistan in 1947. 

She might be onto something here but the point needs a lot of nuance.  One: I think there is general agreement that the Muslims who stayed behind in India after partition in 1947 were for the most part the poorest, the least well educated, the least likely to thrive, so they didn't have much of a start.  Two: "deteriorated."  Does she mean that the position of Muslims has slipped back absolutely?   Or that they have been (are being) left behind in a rising economic tide that (at least until lately) been lifting a lot of boats? 

In either event, there would remain the question of why.  Nomani speaks of Muslims being "disenfranchised" or facing "bureaucratic, housing, job and educational discrimination."  We can set aside "bureaucractic"--I assume that every Indian (and every foreigner who ever traveled in India) can froth at the mouth at the thought of the bureaucracy.  As to the rest--well, not every "disparity" is a "discrimination;" assuming that Indian Muslims have slipped, it would be useful to know a lot more by way of particulars.  One datum that is not open to a lot of interpretation is birth rate: is the Muslim population in India growing faster than the non-Muslim?  If so, it may not be surprising to find that family or per capita incomes are also declining.

Nomani says that "India is going to explode if it doesn't take care of [the Muslim minority]."  Take care how?  She doesn't disclose what she has in mind, but I hope it isn't more by way of quotas, set-asides and such.  India is about the worst advertisement in the world for "affirmative action"--carving out a little piece for every constituency and thereby giving every particularist political stakeholder a reason for being and a command over economic rents.  There's probably nothing that has done more to drive Indian democracy into disrepute than a system of log-rolling over public resources that impels a great country towards sharper and sharper division.

Wednesday, November 26, 2008

Mumbai

I spent a couple of happy days at the Taj Mumbai a few years back. I certainly don't know anything special about today's calamity but let me share some thoughts:
  • Mumbai has had, I think, a remarkable record of staying cool in troubled times--I remember being more or less locked down for several days at another Mumbai hotel during a pretty poisonous time for India as a whole. But Mumbai itself stayed quiet and orderly--well, as quiet and orderly as a city of 19 million can expect to be. Of course, all it takes is once...* **
  • The talking heads keep talking about Mumbai as a city heavy with Americans and Brits. Granted, the terrorists may have targeted Americans and Brits, but I think it is worth keeping in mind that a lot of the real action in Mumbai comes from Gulf Arabs, who like to do in Mumbai what they don't want to do at home.
  • Deccan terrorists? Well, what do I know? But I do know that the south of India--the Deccan and beyond--has been a theater of fairly amicable relations between Hindus and Muslims.
  • I suppose you'd have to assume that this means the end for the moderate, technocratic government of Manmohan Singh, surely one of the most knowledgeable and level-headed (if not necessarily effective) of world leaders--and a resurgence of the roughnecks from the BJP, those folks who never have seen a political fire they haven't wanted to pour gasoline onto.
*A correspondent says I am forgetting the July 11, 2006 subway bombings that took 209 lives. I'm not. I still think that all things considered, Mumbai's record is/was pretty good.

**Yes, yes, and the1993 bombings. Well, maybe I can't sustain the point. But Mumbai is a city with an amazing lot of raw energy, and I'd rather think about the things that work.

Wednesday, August 20, 2008

What You Learn If You Get Your History
From The History Channel

We're in Santa Fe for a bit of opera. More on that anon, but meanwhile, this just in on the death of the British Raj:
You know why the British lost India? Because Churchill hated Gandhi. And the Indians said: "well, if you don't like us, then we don't like you too much either." And so they left.


Thursday, July 03, 2008

Harry S Truman and the Attic

Uri Avneri, writing in the London Review of Books, observes a sea change in Israeli politics: they used to be in it for power, says Avneri; theses days, it’s mainly about money. “I can’t say I ever liked Ehud Olmert,” Avneri confesses:

But now I almost feel sorry for him. It isn’t pleasant the way he is being pounced on. The stories about envelopes stuffed with cash, cigar and luxury suites in posh hotels are good for gossip, but Olmert’s behaviour is no different from that of Binjamin Netanyahu or Ehud Barak. . . . Ben-Gurion, Begin and Rabin didn’t decide to live modest lives and dispense with luxury: they were just not interested in luxuries, money or the easy life.

No question but what he is onto something here, but it is hardly limited to Israel. In his massive history of Modern India, Ramachandra Guha recalls Max Weber, who “once remarked that there are two ways of making politics one’s vocation: Either one lives ‘for’ politics or one lives ‘off’ it.'" Guha explains:

The first generation of Indian leaders lived mostly for politics. They were attracted by the authority they wielded, but also often motivated by a spirit of service and sacrifice. The Indian politicians of the current generation, however, are more likely to enter politics to live off it. They are attracted by power and prestige, and also by the opportunities for financial reward. Control over the state machinery, they knew, can give glittering prizes to those in charge.

In January of 1966, I started work as a Washington correspondent for the The Courier-Journal of Louisville, Kentucky. Part of my brief was a aongressman named John C. Watts. Watts represented the 6th District in the Bluegrass; but more importantly, he presided over an appropriations subcommittee that controlled the tobacco subsidy program. “The thing you need to know about John,” someone (I forget who) told me, “is that he is richer now than he was when he came to Congress.”

Boy, doesn’t that sound quaint? It was offered as a character assessment, identifying a trait that would distinguish him from the common horde. Of course there were exceptions but politicians in those days just weren’t in it for the money. Sam Rayburn didn’t do it for money. Hubert Humphrey didn’t do it for money. Hell, I’d say that not even Richard M. Nixon did it for money, although he would up pretty well heeled at the end. And Clement Atlee? Oh, give us a break. Winston Churchill lived like a lord and very nearly was one. But for most of the life he also lived by his pen, and at that mostly one step of the sheriff. Only at the end did he go into service as a pet poodle to the rich and not terribly respectable—and a lot of people thought he did fatal damage to his reputation in the process.

Hard to say just when and how it changed. I suppose for the United States, a tipping point was Sam Rayburn’s great pupil, Lyndon B. Johnson, someone who was whole orders of magnitude richer when he ascended to the presidency than when he showed up in Washington just a couple of decades before—thanks to his wife’s business acumen, we used to say. Right, and their joint knack for nicking off valuable government resources along the way. Almost hard to remember how, just a few years before, they asked Harry S Truman what he would do at the end of his term when he got home to Independence, MO. “I’ll take the suitcases up to the attic,” he said. These days, none of these guys knows where the suitcase is, or how to find the attic.

Sources: Uri Avneri, “Olmert and Friends,” London Review of Books 10 (19 June 2008); Ramachandra Guha, India After Ghandi 672 (2007).

Monday, January 21, 2008

Overpriced?

Carpe Diem showcases a WSJ story on "the largest-ever subscription in the history of global capital markets" (link):
Reliance Power Ltd.'s 117 billion rupee ($2.98 billion) initial public offering has been set at 450 rupees a share, company Chairman Anil Ambani said.

India's largest capital raising closed to record subscriptions as investors submitted bids valued at more than 7.5 trillion rupees. Demand for the issue, which was open for subscriptions between Jan. 15 and Jan. 18, exceeded supply by 72.9 times.

"This is the largest-ever subscription in the history of global capital markets. It received applications from more than five million retail participants," Mr. Ambani said.

Carpe offers no comment, but isn't this precisely the sort of looniness that cries out "bubble"? (Message brought to you by a guy who thought Google was overpriced at 300.--ed)

Sunday, December 16, 2007

Finer on the Mughals

I seem to have read this before; at any rate I underlined it. But it comes on with force only after I’ve seen it on the ground:

To Europeans, Mughal India was by far the most glamorous of the four great Asian powers dealt with in this book,* and remains so today. What so attracts them is its art and literature and architecture, the gorgeous colourfulness of its courts, the exquisite inlay and fretwork and mosaics in the palaces and shrines and mosques, and not least the fascinating characters of its emperors, whose every deed and happening was recorded in their own private diaries or by the court diarists. But rarely has there been such a contrast between a rich and gorgeous artistic culture and a threadbare political culture. It is impossible not to approach it with a depressing sense of déjà vu. Not one single institutional feature in it is original. All the main components—the royal autocracy, the ambiguities of legitimate title, the contestable rules of succession, the service nobility, their payment of land-revenues, the feudalistic mode of raising the army, the combination of legislative judicial and administrative powers in a single officer, and so forth—are features we have met many times before.

Likewise with the shortcomings of this empire: it was riddled with corruption, especially in the courts. The ruling and extracting classes were the tiniest fraction of the total population, but between one-third and one-half of the total GNP of the 100 million population was engrossed by the imperial court and the 8,000 or so mansadbars—61 percent of the take going ot a mere 655 of these. Extraction on such a scale could only be secured by coercion…

That is, of course, Samuel E. Finer in what remains the best book of the millennium so far: The History of Government, at 1256 (Oxford Paperback ed. 1999—but I only read it in this millennium).

*Tokugawa Japan, 1600-1745; China under the Ch’ing, 1680-1780; The Classical Age of the Ottoman Empire, c. 1566; and the Mughals, 1526-1712.

Thursday, December 13, 2007

Check One

This just rolled out of my pocket: it's a copy of a form that you have to fill out on leaving India. It asks you to specify your "employment." The choices are:
  • Doctor

  • Business

  • Employed (sic?)

  • Media

  • Lawyer

  • Government

  • Sports Person

  • Other

I guess not many bullock drivers go through emigration control. BTW if you go out through Delhi, steer clear of Mr. Vikram Singh--he's the bald one with the little mustache, and he is in a pussy mood, hovers about four minutes over every passport.

Saturday, December 08, 2007

Smog: It's Goin' Round

TigerHawk has some nice pix up re smog in Shanghai (link).

I'll see him Shanghai and raise him with this:


Got it? That's the Taj Mahal in Agra, as seen from the Taj View Hotel, taken about noontime one day last month (for a more benign view, go here). It's out there, honest. Apptly if you want to see the Taj at sunrise, you have to come in, e.g, June, when the temperature may easily reach 115 degrees.

General Thought: I guess it is some kind of irony that this greatest of all architectural monuments reposes in which has to be one of India's ugliest and most unpleasant cities.

Dalrymple on Mughals

William Dalrymple is surely one of the most astute (and sympathetic) western commentators on India. Here's a good sample of his work--dealing with the Mughal empire and emphasising (a) the tolerance of Akbar (but not Arungzeb); and (b) the relatively advanced status of women (link).

Friday, December 07, 2007

No, Thanks...

...we can sleep on the bus:


[Source: Jaisalmer again. What a town.]

Achtung!

Just what I need for the office door:


[Source: up through the medieval gate into Jaisalmer, Rajastan, India.]

Afterthought: I just remembered the sign that my son slapped on his door when he was, I guess, about six:

DO NOT COME IN ANTEEL I SAY

My sentiments exactly.

Thursday, December 06, 2007

Terrorist Recognition Cards

Years ago I had a nice set of "friendly dictator" trading cards. So I shouldn't be surprised at this (link).

[To the contemputuous sneers of Mrs. B, I also acquired, for 50 rupees, a set of dirty-pix playing cards from the Hindu temple at Khajuraho. Leering rights available on application.]

H/T: Michael Froomkin.

Update: Here they are (link)!

TinTin Goes to Bombay

By his own account (link), Gregory David Roberts is a convicted armed robber and a prison escapee, a smuggler, a forger and a gunrunner. But he is also a published novelist so we know that, by profession, he is a con man and a liar.

Roberts' Shantaram is a 933-page doorstop (soon to be a major moving picture!--link), billed as his account of his life on the run, mostly underground in Bombay. I took Shantaram along as a companion on bumpy day-long bus rides across India last month. It was, I have to say, a decidedly mixed bag. I'll detail that point in a moment but I also want to consider a curiosity: the extent to which critics and commentators have swallowed it like a raw oyster, with little or no consideration as to how much of it might be “true.”

Tyler Cowen describes Shantaram as “one of the best bad books I have read” (link). I think Tyler needs to broaden his reading. What would he say of Balzac (say), or Dreiser, or even, forsooth, Faulkner himself?—surely all better books than Roberts’ and bad in more interesting ways.

But I grant that Roberts’ book is indeed a “bad book” in a lot of conventional senses—cardboard characterization, adolescent philosophizing, flowery overwritten romance. He bathes his narrator in almost comic self-admiration: the sensitive, passionate loner with a heart of gold. I think he is shooting for Clint Eastwood but he hits closer to TinTin.

Similarly, there are also a lot of places where I suspect Roberts simply misunderstands his material. Example: his “characters” are for the most part pretty wooden, but he seems to believe he has surrounded himself with a group of international exotics. My own guess is that the originals—and he may not have noticed—were mostly trustafarians, first-world rich kids on a lark. In the same vein, he describes his time living in “a slum.” But by his own account, it isn’t a “slum,” it’s a purpose-built work camp, noisy and chaotic but full of functional people with day jobs: they are, by almost any measure, the aristocracy of the Bombay masses. I don’t think Roberts quite grasps this irony.

But Shantaram it is more than a “bad book”—it’s a wicked book, wicked in the sense that its main purpose is to prove that Roberts the robber and drug dealer isn’t such a bad fellow after all. Sure, he did a bit of this and that (the gun was a toy, as his own website is at pains to point out). But it’s not really his fault (hint: think TV, and the outlaw Ned Kelley). Anyway politicians and big businessmen are worse (unless, inexplicably, the politician/businessman happens to be head of a big city mafia, in which case he is a saintly philosopher). And maybe a lot of his “crimes” aren’t really crimes after all: indeed at one point he seems about to articulate a defense of the black market in currency, but then he seems to say the hell with it, and changes the subject.

Perhaps most offensive, Roberts repeatedly reminds us of how much he screwed up his own life, although nowhere, unless I missed it, does he ever mention that he might have done damage to others (no, strike that, there is one elliptical reference –see p. 602).

Having said this much, I’ll grant Roberts at least one thing, maybe two. First,, he’s good at slam-bang declarative-sentence narrative. A bumpy bus ride is not the place for Kant’s Second Critique, so Robert is bumpy bus ride reading extraordinaire. This is no small achievement, and I am grateful.

Second, as with so many novels these days, there is a lot of throw-away “information” which, if it is indeed information, is quite fascinating. I love the story of how and why the lepers control the illicit pharmaceutical business (can this be a hereditary affair?). I was grimly amused by his account of the social hierarchy of the Bombay jail. I was intrigued by the “Standing Babas”—and here, I need to report, a reader has sought and found some independent verification (link).

Still there remains the nagging question of how much of all this is “true.” And here we have the curious fact. That is, skimming reviews and talking to other readers, I find that ordinary, sentient adults—people whom you might expect to harbor industrial-strength crap detectors—simply let down their guard when it comes to Roberts’ story. “Well, he lived it,” one told me, and a lot of comments join the chorus ((an honorable exception: check out “Denise” in the comments to Cowen (link).

There are two problems with this. One, so far as I can tell, we have very little independent confirmation as to how far he “lived it.” That he was a prisoner in Australia is either true or not true; also that he escaped and went to Bombay. On these primitives, I suppose that if he were lying, then someone would have blown his cover. But with so many of the other details, he might have “lived it,” and he might have heard it from others, and he might have made it up.

Or, short of that, he might simply have written some stretchers. Examples: Roberts didn’t just learn the native language; he learned two native languages, and in less than a year. He didn’t have merely to rewrite his novel after it was trashed; he had to rewrite it twice after it was trashed twice. I can’t say these things didn’t happen. But it would be interesting to hear from a third-party witness (come to think of it, if he did have to write it three times, you’d think it would be a better book: tighter and better plotted—even in novel writing, one can learn from one’s mistakes).

But two: this is a novel, frevvins sakes, and novels are not life. The “Marcel” of Remembrance of Things Past is not the “Marcel” who wrote the book. The “I” of Samarantha is not the “I” who wrote Samarantha—else why call it a novel at all? Anyway, virtually all lives—even the lives of gangsters on the run—are cursed with long stretches of boredom and anomie. But unless you aspire to be Samuel Beckett, you don’t write about boredom and anomie. You write slam-bang action-packed narrative, where something happens on every page—something for the reader will pay $15, to take on a long bus ride, to fend off boredom and anomie. God forbid that you curse is with real life.

So I can’t say I regret spending the $15, nor the time in reading—otherwise I would have been imprisoned with my own thoughts, and who needs that? But for a real account of the Bombay underworld, I think I’ll seek a second opinion.

Update: Many months later (November 29, 2008), I discover I never once referred to it as "Mumbai." How 'bout that. The insight invites more exploration, which I will give it another time.

Wednesday, December 05, 2007

Appreciation: India After Gandhi

The centerpiece of Ramachandra Guha’s long, thick, dense chronicle India After Gandhi (2007) (or as Larry says, “After Gandhi after Gandhi after Gandhi”) is Guha’s account of Indira (Gandhi #2)’s declaration of a “State of Emergency” in 1975, more or less halfway from Independence (in 1947) to the present. The immediate motivation was an unfavorable judicial verdict (students of current events in Pakistan will savor the comparison).

But the broader issue was, by her own account, the “increasing violence” prompted by “a campaign of hate and calumny.” A particular focus of tension was one Jayaprakash Narayan, “a veteran” (as Guha describes him) “of a hundred mostly worthy causes.” By Guha’s account, Narayan was a sometime associate/ally/crony of Indira’s father, the first prime minister, Jawarhalal Nehru. As Guha tells it, Narayan had got in over his head with a gang of mischief-makers who really did represent some sort of threat to good order.

Still, the ironies were too thick to miss. Here was Nehru’s own daughter squashing democracy by looking up Nehru’s old ally. Famously Nehru, in a British jail in the 30s, had written a series of letters to his daughter (then 13) outlining his hopes for a liberated India. A. M. Rosenthal, the New York Times correspondent during the emergency, speculated on what would happen had her father still been alive. He imagined: “Indira is in the Prime Minister’s house, and Jawaharlal is back to writing letters to her from jail again.”

The emergency was a rude conclusion to an era of idealism, but in the end it wasn’t itself as damaging to Indian democracy as one might have expected—Indira ended it in 1977, just as unexpectedly as she had begun it 18 months before. Far worse than the emergency itself was, perhaps, her restructuring of the Congress party—her father’s old vehicle, which emerged in her hands as in institution with no more reason for being other than to preserve the family name. This is why we have been treated to the spectacle of a reluctant airline pilot (her son, Rajiv) and an even more reluctant Italian housewife (her daughter-in-law, Sonia) wrestled against their will into elective politics, with the prospect of another generation yet to come.

The decline of Congress is one aspect of the progressive coarsening and vulgarization of Indian politics; another is the rise of the BJP, the Hindu nationalist party which seeks to replace the secular vision of the founder with a kind of populist ruffianism, predicated on the provocation of ethnic hostility. Guha shrewdly quotes Max Weber saying that “there are two ways of making politics one’s vocation: Either one lives ‘for’ politics or one lives ‘off’ it.” India seems to have settled into a world of two dominant parties who live off politics. As my friend Ray says, each seems to espouse populist redistribution (when out of power) and privatizing despoliation (when in).

In this respect, India may not be much worse off than many other of the world’s democracies, but is a far cry from the vision of the founder. Indeed, one of the strongest messages that comes through from Guha’s account is how lucky we were to have Nehru at all. He certainly wasn’t perfect: he was a patrician and a snob and he made bad decisions (e.g., concerning the allocation of resources for education) that hinder India yet today. But the Chinese got Mao and the Indonesians got Surkano: by comparison Nehru looks like a virtual saint.

Guha tells the story comprehensively, if somewhat ploddingly. It’s pretty clear that he is an old Nehru man himself, but he is largely fair-minded and clear-eyed. He doesn’t always seem to master the conceptual or analytical structure necessary to make sense out of his story: I would still like to know just how the nascent state fended off the peril of fragmentation. And there is much more to be said as to how old socialist India veered so far down the road to the free market. There is also one scandalous oversight: the utter lack of a bibliography (although the footnotes are pretty thorough). Still, it will be a long time before we have a more comprehensive or reliable account of this momentous chapter in the history of a great nation.